The Oil Transition and its Implications for Cities and Regions by Newman, Peter
The Oil Transition and its Implications for Cities and 
Regions 
Peter Newman  
(for book ‘Transitions: Pathways towards sustainable 
urban developments in Australia’ ed Peter Newton, 
CSIRO Books, 2008.) 
 
 
The Global Oil Peak 
In 1956 M King Hubbert first suggested that the US would peak in oil production in 
1970; despite being greeted with derision by many economists it happened. The US 
began to import oil which led to the strengthening of OPEC and the geopolitics of oil 
in the last part of the 20th century. The US now imports half of its oil and by 
November 2006 this cost was $350 billion (the website zfacts.com shows a 
continuous scrolling total of what oil imports are costing the US).  
 
This chapter is premised on an even deeper crisis than that faced by the US in the past 
few decades: the global oil production peak and what this may mean for our cities. 
 
Global discoveries of oil peaked in the 1960’s as shown in Figure 1. The Figure also 
shows how global oil production has followed the general shape of the Hubbert curve 
apart from reductions due to the three oil crises of 1973, 1979 and 1991 before 
following a general upward trend until 2005. 2006 has seen reductions in oil 
production despite there being growth in oil demand of around 2 to 3% (mainly due to 
China and India though together they still only take 12% of world oil production 
while the US takes 26%).  Some believe that the peak in conventional oil production 
has now happened.  
 
 
Fig 1 Peak oil in discoveries and production as well as the Hubbert Model. 
Source: Association for the Study of Peak Oil (Australia), www.aspo-
australia.org.au 
 
Enormous effort has gone into trying to discover more oil and to extract more from 
the reserves that remain. Oil reserves are now growing at a much slower rate than oil 
is being consumed. A peak in global oil production is therefore inevitable. There are 
various estimates of when the peak will occur but they cluster around the early part of 
this century, with a few (now mostly discredited) way out into the future. C J 
Campbell, an oil geophysicist who founded the Association for the Study of Peak Oil, 
says that conventional oil peaked in 2004 and all oil liquids will peak in 2010. 
Deffyes (2006) has calculated an exact date for the peak at the 16th December, 2005 
and then found that he was a few months out as May 2006 appears to have been the 
peak in conventional oil (see Figure 2 on World Oil Production, 2001-2006).  
 
 
There is much debate about whether the peak is only short term, whether we bounce 
along on the top of the curve for a decade or so, or whether we begin a precipitous 
decline. Campbell (2004)says: 
‘The real point is not so much the exact date of peak but the statement that the 
First Half of the Oil Age, which was characterized by growing production, is 
about to be followed by the Second Half when oil production is set to decline 
along with all that depends upon it. On that at least we can stand firm. ‘ 
 
An Australian television show on peak oil (ABC Catalyst, November,2005) reported 
an Australian oil company CEO who had asked the attendees at the previous 
Australian Petroleum Production and Exploration Association conference whether 
they thought the global oil production peak had already occurred - half raised their 
hands. Global oil production has declined by about 1% globally in 2006/7.  
 
More conservative estimates from government sources in the UK and US are saying 
that the peak (including non-conventional deep sea oil) is sometime around 2010 to 
2020 (Morita et al, 2001; IEA, 2006). Michael Pacheco from NREL National 
Biotechnology Center says that ‘We need to start working toward replacement fuels 
20 years before that peak’ (Consumer Reports, 2006). So, whatever the peak (and  it is 
probably earlier rather than later) we are already well behind schedule in responding 
adequately to this challenge. 
 
Oil companies tend to give statistics on oil availability based on how long it will last 
at present rates of consumption. This tends to be around 30 to 40 years, but this is 
misleading as oil will not keep being produced at the same rate then suddenly stop. 
The second half of the production cycle is harder so there is physically less and less 
available each year once the peak is passed. In an economy used to increases each 
year this is a significant difference. The peak is the critical change point. 
 
Despite attempts by OPEC in recent times to increase production, global oil seems to 
be at or close to its full capacity. This level may hold for a few years then it will 
inevitably fall. This is happening just as China and India have entered the global oil 
market in a big way – China is now the world’s second biggest consumer of oil. 
Supply to consumers in the west will be constrained by physical capacity and by the 
new players in the global market. The reality is the Golden Age of oil is over. A rash 
of academic and popular articles has supported this perspective, including respected 
trade journals like Oil and Gas International (a number of the key books are listed in 
the references). 
 
Why has there been a growing awareness and concern around this issue? A number of 
geophysicists and industry insiders have ‘blown the whistle’ with their misgivings, 
especially on how real the oil reserves actually are. Most oil reserves are in the hands 
of OPEC but these analysts were concerned about the reality of some Middle Eastern 
reserves (especially Saudi Arabia); they were able to demonstrate that ‘phantom 
reserves’ had been created in the past decades in order to create higher OPEC quotas 
on production. Quotas on production were a license to make money in a world willing 
to pay for more oil. Re-evaluating the known geophysical data by people like 
Campbell, shows we are close to the peak, if not already there, and that oil will soon 
be subject to major physical shortages.  
 
There are many conferences on this topic now, especially by the Association for Peak 
Oil. A key presenter at their International Oil Depletion Workshop in 2002 was 
Matthew Simmons, a prominent energy-sector investment banker from Houston and 
author of ‘Twilight in the Desert’ which shows that Saudi Arabia’s reserves are not 
what the world had been relying on. Simmons said:  
"I have studied the depletion issue intensely for too long now to have any 
remaining doubts as to the severity of the issue. But I am still amazed at the 
limited knowledge that exists, even in the U.S. or within our major oil and gas 
company’s senior management about this topic and its dire consequences". 
(Simmons, 2002) 
"Most serious scientists worry that the world oil supplies will peak [and then 
decline]. Peaking of oil cannot be predicted accurately, but the event will occur. 
Peaking turns out to only be clear through a ’rear-view mirror’. By then, an 
alternative or solution is too late. My analysis leads me to worry that peaking is 
at hand, not years away. If I am right, the unforeseen consequences are 
devastating. The facts are too serious to ignore.” (Simmons, 2003) 
 
Bentley (2002 p205)from the Oil Depletion Analysis Centre in London published an 
article overviewing oil in Energy Policy and concluded: 
 
“The date of this resource-limited global peak depends on the size of Middle-
East reserves, which are poorly known, and unreliably reported. Best estimates 
put the physical peak of global conventional oil production between 5 and 10 
years from now. The world contains large quantities of non-conventional oil, 
and various oil substitutes. But the rapidity of the decline in the production of 
conventional oil makes it probable that these non-conventional sources cannot 
come on-stream fast enough to fully compensate. The result will be a sustained 
global oil shortage.” 
 
A  report prepared for the US Department of Energy by Hirsch et al (2005,page 
64)confirmed such warnings: 
... the world has never faced a problem like this. Without massive 
mitigation more than a decade before the fact, the problem will be pervasive 
and will not be temporary. Previous energy transitions were gradual and 
evolutionary. Oil peaking will be abrupt and revolutionary.’ 
 
Dr Samsam Bakhtiari, of the National Iranian Oil Company, provided a pessimistic 
view of future oil supply decline and of its effects:  
    "Seen from a Middle Eastern perspective, the present global oil situation can be 
summarized within five major and inescapable trends:        * The world's super giant 
and giant oil fields are dying off; 
        * There are no more major frontier regions left to explore besides the earth's 
poles; 
        * Production of non-conventional crude oil has been initiated at great costs --- 
in Venezuela's Orinoco belt, Canada's Athabasca tar sands and ultra-deep waters; 
        * Even OPEC's oil production has its limits; 
        * No major primary energy rival can possibly take over from oil and gas in the 
medium term.  
 
    Adding up these five trends, one can envision a global oil crunch at the horizon --- 
most probably within the present decade.......It would take a number of miracles to 
thwart such a rational scenario. Now, a single miracle is always a possibility, but a 
series of simultaneous miracles is not --- for there are limits even to God Almighty's 
mercifulness" (Samsam Bakhtiari, 2002 ,page 3). 
 
Dr Bakhtiari has since published simulations of the World Oil Production Capacity 
model which suggest that global oil production will peak before the end of the decade, 
and most likely by 2006-07 (Samsam Bakhtiari (2004)). Dr Bakhtiari visited Australia 
presenting seminars in four cities in 2004 and also briefed the Western Australia 
Cabinet about oil depletion risks – one of the few times a ‘peaker’ has been able to 
speak directly to decision-makers. 
 
Oil companies are now beginning to break with their traditional approach of only 
giving ‘years of oil remaining’. A paper in December 2002 by Exxon Mobil Vice 
President, Harry J. Longwell (Longwell 2002) contains the world oil discovery 
decline curve which agrees well with those published in Aleklett and Campbell (2002) 
and shown earlier. Acknowledgment of this by a major oil company is very 
significant as it is clear that oil production can only follow oil discoveries. Longwell 
also showed a peak of global gas discovery in about 1970 with a sharp decline in 
natural gas discovery rates since then. 
 
Denial? 
Although there is growing awareness of the problem, there is also widespread 
ignorance and denial, in most sectors of the community. Why? The reality of the 
dominance of economics with its inherent optimism about resources is the core reason 
why most serious people don’t take ‘peakers’ seriously. Obviously oil companies 
don’t want to talk up looming shortages due to the impact on their share price, though 
23% of Shell’s reserves stated from 1997 to 2004 were found to be ‘phantom 
reserves’ which led to the resignation of their CEO in 2005 and some real share price 
issues after they were fined $122 million for accounting fraud by the Securities 
Exchange Commission. .  
Governments can take their share of responsibility for not wanting to jump into this 
issue as well; it is rarely in their interest to disturb people about something as 
fundamental as their oil dependence, despite the odd statement like President Bush’s 
2006 State of the Union comment about the US ‘addiction to oil’. But most of all, the 
community at large seems unwilling to think about the implications of increasing oil 
scarcity and just wanting the price to be kept down. The Guardian (2nd December 
2003) in an article called "Bottom of the barrel – The world is running out of oil - so 
why do politicians refuse to talk about it?" concluded:  
“Every generation has its taboo, and ours is this: that the resource upon 
which our lives have been built is running out. We don't talk about it because 
we cannot imagine it. This is a civilization in denial.” 
This is an ‘elephant in the bedroom’ issue. We prefer to go on with life as though it 
weren’t there. It challenges every aspect of life. We have spent the past 50 or more 
years building our cities and rural regions around the free availability of cheap oil.  
 
Are there alternatives to oil? 
 
The alternatives to oil are set out in Box 1  
Box 1. Alternatives to oil. 
1. Non-conventional oil which is mostly from deeper wells and some heavier 
oils (this is usually included in most scenarios, even though it still requires 
considerable technological development to extract economically);  
2. ‘Dirty oil’ which is from tar sands and oil shale and which have serious 
environmental problems as well as requiring huge amounts of water and 
natural gas to extract from their sand and rock, making them large greenhouse 
contributors (these are also usually included but are only small contributors); 
3. Biofuels such as ethanol from corn or sugar cane, and biodiesel from soybean 
and waste oil (promising but limited as soon hits food conflict, see below; 
needs to be a breakthrough in cellulose to fuel technology); 
4. GTL and CTL which are gas-to-liquids and coal-to-liquids which are known 
technologies and are small operations that could be increased (though each 
take a lot of energy to create the diesel, are capital intensive and worse in 
terms of greenhouse); 
5. Hydrogen which requires an energy source to split it from water and can then 
be used in hydrogen fuel cell vehicles (however this is not yet past the 
experimental phase in most vehicles and requires a complete overhaul in 
infrastructure to provide, though in the long term is likely to be favored as 
long as it comes from renewable sources). 
 
 
The response from most economists to peak oil is that supply and demand will create 
the necessary change and these alternatives will seamlessly fill the gap; technological 
modernism and the idea of substitutability of resources due to price, is still the most 
powerful paradigm of our age. ‘The Stone Age didn’t end with a shortage of stones’ is 
a statement frequently heard when oil depletion is debated. However there seems to 
be something quite different and challenging about oil as it is so fundamental to 
everything we do and is likely to involve a considerably more expensive set of 





BP Exploration Manager Richard Miller(2004, p10), in response to the statement 
about ‘stone shortages’, said that:  
 
 “This is the classical economist's view: something will turn up, when the price 
of oil is high enough, because something always does. But there isn't anything 
conceivable that could replace conventional oil, in the same quantities or 
energy densities, at any meaningful price. We can't mine the oil sands in 
sufficient quantity because there isn't enough water to process them. We can't 
grow bio-fuels because there would be no land left to grow food. Solar, hydro, 
wind, and geothermal don't yield enough energy, hydrogen (from water) takes 
more energy to make than it can yield, and nuclear fission and fusion are 
presently off most political agendas... When oil gets too expensive, surviving 
Americans will still obtain energy from alternative sources, but in much smaller 
amounts and at much higher prices.  
 
The true size of the gap that is opening up between demand and supply gives some 
idea of the task that is required if we are to continue by switching to alternatives. The 
amount required by 2030 is equivalent to 6000 500MW power plants. None of the 
alternatives get anywhere near being able to provide even a reasonable proportion of 
this.  
 
In the US there has been a sudden growth in ethanol as the possible replacement for 
gasoline and biodiesel for diesel. This has meant that ethanol production (mostly from 
corn) rose to 4.8 billion gallons in 2006 and biodiesel (mostly from soybean oil and 
waste grease) to 75 million gallons; however it is worth seeing that this is less than 
2% of the gasoline consumption and a mere 0.2% of the diesel consumed. They are 
bit players only.  
 
Much has been suggested as being possible with biofuels because Brazil has managed 
a much higher proportion of their fuel from distilling sugarcane (Worldwatch, 2006). 
Lester Brown (2006) has suggested that there is a growing conflict developing 
between food for people and food for cars. He shows that grain reserves worldwide 
have been depleted by this sudden use of US corn and that a doubling of ethanol 
production (which seems almost certain) will induce a major crisis in the price of 
grain; this is occurring when nearly a billion people in the world remain 
malnourished.  In 2007 30% of US grain crop went into bio fuel leading to a tripling 
of world grain prices.  To convert the entire grain crop of the US would produce just 
12% of the gasoline and diesel supply in the US – this will not happen as regulations 
on the amount of food going to make fuel will be applied.  
 
The UK Minister for the Environment from 1997 to 2003 Michael Meacher says: 
‘Alternatives like biofuels, ethanol or biomass can play a marginal role but nowhere 
near on the scale required. When the oil runs out the economic and social dislocation 
will be unprecedented.’ (Meacher, 2006 page?). He goes on to quote Exxon Mobil’s 
John Thompson who foresees that by 2015 we will need to find and develop 8 out of 
the 10 barrels of oil (and gas equivalent) that we are now producing from. This is just 
‘not available’, he concludes.  
 
What all this suggests is that conventional oil and natural gas are in a league of their 
own. As they become less available the alternatives are going to take a lot more work 
to provide and hence are bound to be more expensive. The era of cheap oil seems to 
be incontrovertibly over. 
 
Alternatives such as the ‘dirty oils’, and coal to liquids are likely to be highly 
marginal as they require so much energy to produce them. The Canadian tar sands for 
example require substantial quantities of natural gas to extract the oil from the sand 
and hence require subsidies.  And this does not include the external costs of their 
environmental impacts or their greenhouse impacts which are substantial.  
 
The biofuel alternatives are also quite marginal as substantial energy is needed to 
distill them from their carbohydrate base. Some potential exists for reductions in this 
ratio if the conversion of cellulosic material (agricultural and forestry waste for 
example) to ethanol can be commercially developed (WorldWatch, 2006).  
 
Critiques of peak oil 
For the past few decades of debate on peak oil the International Energy Agency (IEA) 
has been a peak oil skeptic. They have always said that there is much more to be 
found that will enable us to proceed for 50 years as we have been doing.  The 
International Energy Agency in 2006 released a report to analyze where peak oil 
pundits have got it wrong.  It does little to ease concern. In the IEA (2005 ) report, 
“Resources to Reserves: Oil & Gas Technologies for the Energy Markets of the 
Future,” Claude Mandil, the IEA’s executive director, says:  
“Soaring oil prices have again spotlighted the old question. Are we running out of 
oil? The doomsayers are again conveying grim messages through the front pages of 
major newspapers. ‘Peak oil’ is now part of the general public’s vocabulary, along 
with the notion that oil production may have peaked already, heralding a period of 
inevitable decline.” (page 6)  
Mandil however says “the IEA has long maintained that none of this is a cause for 
concern (p6)” Then the report looks at the data and says most countries outside of 
OPEC: 
 “…have passed their peaks in conventional oil production, or will do so 
shortly…Their world is one of maturing oil fields. Their exploration and production 
costs are typically higher but they limit OPEC’s monopoly effect, thus operating with 
smaller margins. Cost reduction is therefore a constant concern. Proven reserves to 
production ratios are small, averaging around 15 years and production in the older 
fields is declining (page 46).” 
This is the exact problem that ‘peakers’ have been trying to highlight for some time. 
The report goes on to confirm that the peak oil theory did describe accurately what 
happened in the US in the 1970’s: 
 “The striking success of Hubbert in predicting the peak of U.S. production suggests 
that such conditions were more or less met in the U.S. during that time period.” 
(page42) 
This has never been admitted before by the IEA.  
The report then questions the current relevance of Hubbert to global oil production 
suggesting that:  
“The controversies surrounding peak oil in the literature revolve around four main 
points. Does the Hubbert model apply to oil production worldwide? If the Hubbert 
model does apply, when will the peak in worldwide oil production be? What happens 
after the peak? How fast will the decrease of production be? What role does 
technology play in such models?(page 42)” 
After admitting that a peak could be approaching (maybe even 2010) the report opts 
for new technologies and increased investment as the way to counter any production 
inflection. But the level of investment suggested as being necessary is almost beyond 
belief. It will need by 2030 around $5 trillion or about half a billion dollars a day 
between now and then. It is hard to imagine such numbers but $5 trillion is half of the 
entire GNP of the United States. The report concludes that:  
“Neither private enterprise nor national companies necessarily have the incentive to 
assume the risk…. Furthermore, private industry cannot be relied upon to invest in 
research on technologies that are too far from being economical.(page 119)” 
If this is the good news about peak oil then it is understandable why many people are 
getting worried. The IEA have only confirmed the unease that we have about the oil 
situation. The peak oil crisis to them is a capital crisis to create more oil from 
expensive hard to get sources and certain alternatives. They too can see that the era of 
cheap oil is ending. The IEA have finally recognized that conventional oil is peaking 
and may decline by as much as 5%. This is a remarkable admission.  But they then 
suggest that unlike all the other oil fields that have been declining the next batch will 
be pushed much harder so that they will not decline in the traditional manner. They 
believe much more can be squeezed out of conventional wells to ease us through the 
next few years and then the alternatives will flow. Considerable questioning about the 
potential for pushing conventional oil was raised by critics of this report, eg Brown 
(2006), but the amount of alternatives that can be produced to fill the looming gap 
received the biggest critique (Cohen, 2006; Kunstler, 2006). 
This is the motivation for casting this chapter around peak oil. The only real solutions 
being proffered by groups such as IEA are part of the problem. I would suggest that 
there are many more cost effective solutions facing us in our cities and rural regions. 
A capital crisis which is beyond our capability is just as real a crisis to the future of 





Natural gas…savior or same problem? 
 
Natural gas is the obvious transition fuel to help ease the problem of oil depletion.  It 
can be converted to diesel as well as being used in vehicles itself. Natural gas has 
already been used to replace heating oil in many homes and to replace oil used in 
commerce and industry. In Australia oil went from 57% of the fuel mix in 1980/81 to 
48% in 1997/98 whilst natural gas went from 13% to 20% as boilers, kilns, stoves and 
heaters all shifted to natural gas (Productivity Commission, 2005).  
 
The next stage would appear to be to switch to greater use of natural gas in transport 
as trucks and trains can use CNG or LNG in their diesel engines and cars can be 
switched over as well (particularly if the manufacturer makes them as standard as 
occurred in Sweden when the government committed to gas cars for their vehicle 
fleet). The attraction is that natural gas is already in place in terms of distribution 
infrastructure although actual filling stations are not in place.  
The conversion to natural gas is an obvious step in places like Australia where there is 
a good supply of natural gas available. However in Europe and in the US this is not 
the case. Europe is going to far away places in the east to bring their gas and already 
some signs of an OPEC-like protection of the resource are developing. In the US 
natural gas has already peaked and they are now looking to import it using LNG 
tankers – starting an overseas dependence similar to the oil issue when they peaked in 
local oil production in 1970.  
 
Global natural gas production has had similar estimates on its peak to oil, and they 
range from 2010 to 2030 (eg Fleahy, 2002; Caruso, 2003). The peak in discoveries 
was in the late 60’s to early 70’s so the same pattern as oil seems to be evident. It is 
not surprising that oil and natural gas are working in tandem as they have similar 
geological origins in marine sediment (unlike coal which comes from ancient forests). 
Also oil prices and natural gas prices are closely linked so as oil goes up in price the 
same is likely to occur for natural gas. Natural gas can only be a small part of the 
transitional arrangements for oil; it cannot be seen as the long term replacement.  
 
With natural gas in short supply the world must come to grips with another energy 
source for use in commercial and residential heating, cooking, water heating and even 
electric power… as that has replaced oil in many parts of the world. Natural gas is 
much more critical in industry and is likely to attract a premium for its use there. But 
the agenda now must be building houses and offices where they can use solar and 
renewable fuels as well as designing to use less fuel overall. This will be one of the 
key focus points for the chapter along with how gasoline and diesel can be reduced in 
transport.  
 
Industrial and petrochemical uses of oil and natural gas, freight diesel, and aviation, 
would appear to be premium applications of oil. As oil peaks these premium uses will 
mean that the decline in availability for private transport and buildings will be even 
more obvious, the need to do something about replacing them will be even more 
critical.  
 
It is sometimes stated that nuclear power and coal can take up the slack with these 
fuels. However nuclear and coal are for electricity and bear little relationship to the 
issues being considered here. Coal can be converted to liquid fuel though it is a minor 
option in most scenarios due to the compounding of the greenhouse problem as well 
as the expense of conversion. Electric vehicles are not yet a viable alternative 
although electric transit is and will be promoted here though it will not increase the 
need for electric power much as electric transit is very efficient compared to cars 
(Tokyo’s electric rail system achieves over 6600 miles per gallon equivalent). But 
transit helps reduce travel in total so good transit should be associated with 
considerable reductions in travel distances as cities are rebuilt in more efficient 
patterns. Electricity can be used for home heating also but it is extremely expensive 
compared to oil and gas so it is much more likely that solar building will be cheaper, 
especially when greenhouse impacts are included in the costs. The Solar City agenda 
is to reduce heating oil, natural gas and electricity as well as tap into renewable 





Figure 3 sets out the production cycle of conventional and non-conventional oil and 
natural gas as concluded from the various global studies.  This figure suggests that 
conventional oil peaking is occurring now and that this will ensure the price of oil 
remains high. It concedes that we may have a few years of non conventional oil and 
gas where we can continue some small growth although there are indications that 
maybe all fossil fuel liquids combined has peaked as discussed above (Mushalik, 
2007). Available evidence points to a critical turning point around 2010 when even 
with all the non-conventional oil and natural gas on-stream, the global peak will 
occur. The period between then and now is when conventional oil and natural gas are 
peaking and will enter a serious decline phase. It is time to respond seriously to these 
trends. The demand curve is set to grow at a much lower rate than previous growth as 
the price goes up, but there is still going to be growth in demand that is linked to 
forecast growth in the population of our cities and regions. What can they do? 
 
 
Peter----can you give the Source for your figures if they are not yours THEY ARE 
MINE. 
In order to gather some perspective on the transition to the future it is important to see 
how current fuels are used and how each one is likely to change. Figure 4 sets out this 
same figure with the various components and uses of oil and gas divided roughly into 
the functions and fuels that these resources have been put into, plus some idea as to 
how they will continue into the future as they decline.  
 
Diesel is presently used for small scale power stations and for pumping water; these 
can now be easily replaced by solar and wind technologies and thus diesel for non-
transport purposes should be immediately phased out (Barlow et al, 1993; 
www.rise.org.au).  Some extra premium is applied to diesel for freight and agriculture 
and also aviation fuel but these can only last for awhile so these functions must also 
begin to decline if they are only able to access these fuels. Heating oil is rapidly 
replaced and probably is already being phased out by refineries in favor of other 
grades of oil. Gasoline, the biggest part of the oil pie, inevitably must enter a steep 
decline phase. Natural gas is seen to take up a small proportion of the transport and 
building task but along with its other functions, natural gas too begins its inexorable 
decline, especially in the less premium functions for commercial and residential 
buildings.  
 
The focus of this chapter is on the large area contained by the question mark. What 
can replace the growth in demand (for liquid fossil fuels) that has been driving our 
cities and regions for the past century? What will take up the slack as decline sets in? 
The answer from this chapter is set out in Figure 5 and Figure 6. 
 
In terms of alternative fuels there are ways that could enable the decline to at least be 
set to zero rather than the 5% decline expected (see Figure 4). This is highly 
optimistic for a number of the options. All non-conventional oil and natural gas is 
already assumed in the supply figure even though much of this needs to be developed 
in deeper and more remote areas. Of the alternatives , natural gas will fill some of the 
gap before it leads into the use of Hydrogen from renewable sources perhaps by 
around 2020; electricity will increase in its use for transport through electric rail and 
electric vehicles; some ‘dirty oil’ will be produced from Tar Sands and Oil Shale 
before their greenhouse impact and their low energy ratios mean they are not pursued; 
coal to liquids will be increased but not much as its greenhouse problems and energy 
ratios will soon show it to be a nineteenth century solution; and biofuels will take the 
largest share of the gap, expanding into the future. 
 
INSERT FIG., 5 and 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
There are many who do not think that this quantity of alternatives can be produced 
and their infrastructures built in the time required. I have been reasonably optimistic, 
perhaps too much. But it still leaves us with a yawning gap opening up. Thus Figure 6 
suggests we will fill this gap with conservation, due to:  
• reducing the need for travel in our cities and regions through rebuilding in new 
forms together with lifestyle changes;  
• alternative transport options such as transit, bicycling and walking; 
• vehicle efficiency; and 
• solar buildings and renewables. 
These, together with the alternative fuels, will be the basis for the new economy in 
our cities. Innovative cities are beginning to show the way on this agenda but it is a 
long way from becoming main streamed enough to create the changes necessary to 







The oil and natural gas context suggests we are facing a serious challenge. Most cities 
face a future where they are expecting an increase in cars and an increase in buildings. 
However, there are serious questions about whether this can happen. From here on 
cities wanting to grow in their use of cars will need to do so with less and less oil. 
This will mean either alternative fuels or reduced need for cars. From here on cities 
wanting to grow their number of dwellings and other buildings will need to do so with 
less and less heating oil and natural gas - not more. This will require alternative fuels, 
renewables and reduced need for energy.   
 
How quickly will the decline set in?  
 
As suggested in Figure 4  the conventional oil decline could be as much as 5% per 
year. The goal for Campbell (2001) is that we must cut demand by 5% per year 
through to 2050. Even if a more conservative 3% per year decline in availability of 
conventional oil and natural gas became the normal setting for cities, what would this 
mean? To begin with, there will be a clear case for some uses to continue with their 
functions as they are so critical to the functioning of cities.  As outlined above it is 
likely that cities will have to use dramatically less oil and natural gas in buildings and 
transport as other uses capable of paying premium prices take it up. Thus instead of 
growth in these fuels for transport and buildings we are facing perhaps more than 5% 
per year declines in these normal household uses. This will mean alternative fuels will 
be essential but also we will need to better manage the design for these functions. We 
will rapidly need different buildings which don’t need as much heating;or cooling  
and it will mean differently configured cities which rapidly reduce their need for cars.   
 
Responding to this challenge is necessary even if the oil crisis was not happening (see 
other chapters about health and environmental issues associated with car dependence), 
but it makes the agenda of managing the car and making more use of the sun even 
more vital, if not critical to the future of cities.  If we don’t respond then what is likely 
to happen?  
 
City Futures  
Cities have grown strongly in the age of cheap oil. Cities are presently growing 
globally at 2.3% per year and rural areas at 0.1% which means people are still leaving 
the country for the city. Today around half of humanity live in cities. Nearly all cities 
participate in a global economy which has been built around the availability of cheap 
oil.  
 
There are no models we can easily use to understand how cities will manage in the 
age of reduced oil availability. All Australian cities have recently had strategic 
planning studies done for the next 30 years of development. Although the studies have 
recognized that there is a need to reduce automobile dependence and save on oil, they 
have not intervened in any radical way to stop oil-consuming behaviours, and they 
have assumed continuing growth in population and jobs – growth which peak oil 
could throw into doubt. What will happen to such cities as oil peaks? I am suggesting 
four possible scenarios. 
 
1. Collapse 
Many forecasts of the consequences of peak oil are taking on an increasingly 
apocalyptic tinge. The work of Jared Diamond (2005) on how civilizations in the past 
have collapsed is often related to this issue. A Republican Senator, Roscoe Bartlett, 
after discovering peak oil said ‘Civilization as we know it will end soon.’ Websites 
that discuss this possibility talk about the ‘die-off’ scenario where billions will die as 
the world’s cities are unable to adapt to the decline phase of the oil cycle.  
 
I would not want to discount this as a possibility, history is littered with cities that did 
not adapt.  But I would point out that there are many cities that use hardly any fuel 
(such as Chinese and Indian cities at around 2 GJ per person per year) many that are 
very wealthy use only a modicum of oil and could easily adapt to almost nothing (eg 
Tokyo and Barcelona use 8 GJ per person) whilst most US, Canadian and Australian 
cities use frightening amounts of fuel (Australian and Canadian cities average around 
30 GJ, US cities average 56 GJ with Atlanta the highest at 103 GJ per person; also see 
Newman and Kenworthy, 2007).  
 
Thus some cities could easily collapse but most are likely to be able to adapt. The 
emerging sub-prime mortgage meltdown in the US has started the collapse of some 
outer and fringe suburbs as people cannot afford to pay their mortgages due to 
increased transport costs which they are highly vulnerable to in these areas.  
 
2. Ruralised City.  
Some people believe that our cities will respond to this possibility of ‘collapse’ by 
dispersing and we will then create a more sustainable semi-rural lifestyle where we 
will all be responsible for a large proportion of our own food. This would be reflected 
in suburban agriculture, permaculture villages or hobby farms (Trainer, 1995; 
Gunther, 2001; Holmgren, 2002, 2005) where most of the economy we now see has 
been devolved down to small groups or even individual households. It is a ruralisation 
of cities. Holmgren (2005) sees the suburbs as a farming opportunity waiting to 
happen: 
 
'Suburban sprawl' in fact give us an advantage. Detached houses are easy 
to retrofit, and the space around them allows for solar access and space 
for food production. A water supply is already in place, our pampered, 
unproductive ornamental gardens have fertile soils and ready access to 
nutrients, and we live in ideal areas with mild climates, access to the sea, 
the city and inland country.’  
Fundamental to this scenario is population decline as a quick calculation shows that 
the available land to enable small scale production would quickly disappear if all of 
our cities were pushed out onto agricultural land. The transition is never described but 
it would seem that the ‘Killing Fields’ would be a playground by comparison. It is 
sometimes euphemistically called ‘the die-off scenario’. It is however often discussed 
with some relish as the anti-population, anti-urban movements often link together to 
imagine a ruralised city as the preferred future. Peak oil is thus sometimes grabbed 
hold of with glee.  Such ideas are rarely challenged and their currency grows daily 
under the frightening scenarios of peak oil.  
 
I do not believe it is a likely scenario. The broad sweep of history shows that although 
cities have collapsed as they depleted their soils or were unable to manage their 
settlements or were destroyed by invaders, they have not gone back to a rural Eden: 
cities tend to be rebuilt, and have endured and grown.  
 
The reason we rebuild and adapt cities is that our choices for returning to nature are 
very limited and to most people, are not acceptable. Not only do we not want to 
become totally dependent on foraging or hunting for our food, we mostly do not want 
the responsibility for food production at all. The attractions of doing other things that 
are only possible if we are freed from food production, drives us to cities.  
 
The example of Havana in Cuba is often presented as a city that had to develop its 
own agricultural response to being cut off from oil when the Soviet regime collapsed. 
This was an important phenomenon but the reality is that Havana kept going as a city 
it did not just evolve into a permaculture paradise. We are going to have come to 
terms with a new kind of agriculture and a new kind of city, but we are not likely to 
reverse 13,000 years of urban history. Nor would we want to as the consequences for 
rural production as occurred in the forced ruralisation programs of Mao and Pol Pot 
were disastrous. 
 
Cities are our likely habitat for the foreseeable future. We need to constantly adapt 
our urban technology and lifestyles to ensure cities are more sustainable: in their 
resources, in their ecological base and in their human livability. They can collapse if 
we don’t adapt. In the same way rural production will still need to be the source of 
food, minerals and materials. Such activity however will need to adjust to being done 
without oil, or it also will collapse. The core argument of Jared Diamond is not that 
there are physical limits which exist but that our ability to adapt to these is the real 
test of our civilization. 
 
3. Divided City. 
The response in this scenario is that some people (those with the economic means 
mostly) will move to centres where electric transit and short walkable destinations are 
easily available. Highly efficient healthy buildings full of solar technologies ensure 
that those who can afford to can live even better than before. Outside of these dense 
eco-centres are the dispersed suburbs which become poorer and poorer, descending 
into a kind of collapse that is depicted in the Mad Max films with gasoline being the 
resource that warring gangs fight over (George Miller’s movies were apparently 
inspired by reading about peak oil).  
 
There are many signs of this possibility occurring.  The wealthy are moving to central 
locations and especially to transit-oriented-developments(TODs).  The poor are 
increasingly having to pay a higher and higher proportion of their income on transport 
(STPP, 2005). The market will move quickly to enhance this option as fuel prices rise 
and we are beginning to see the first signs in the US of abandoned outer suburban 
developments and rapidly accelerating inner urban enclaves of wealth. This Divided 
City could become significantly worse quite quickly and it is not hard to imagine.  
 
4. Resilient, Sustainable Solar City. 
This is obviously how we must try to move. It is a city where all that the wealthy are 
seeking in Divided City is provided for across the whole city with genuine walkable 
city centres being built in all of the suburbs linked by quality electric transit. It may 
mean abandoning some of the far flung scattered rural hobby farms around cities 
where no real urban services can be provided without excessive driving. These areas 
are seen to be ideal land uses by some in the permaculture movement but invariably 
they are heavily car dependent suburbs where neither rural nor urban functions 
survive well. It is a conflict that must be resolved before the price of oil causes real 
pain for such residents.  
 
So what should we do to achieve such cities? 
 
1. Take it seriously – create Peak Oil Strategies. 
Awareness of this issue needs to go through a similar process to the one that the world 
has adopted over climate change. Global conferences of nations need to be established 
through the UN, in order to set goals and begin sharing information on how the world 
economy can be weaned off oil. States and cities need to create Peak Oil Strategies. In 
Western Australia, in our State Sustainability Strategy there is a section on Oil 
Vulnerability, the Gas Transition and the Hydrogen Economy (Government of WA, 
2003). This set out the peak oil issue and began a process of examining what it could 
mean. It was a major reason why the state backed a Hydrogen Fuel Cell Bus trial as 
well as a revamped electric rail system, as it helped us to begin to work on these 
issues of transition away from oil. Two cities have now developed Peak Oil Strategies 
– Portland and Brisbane (City of Portland Peak Oil Taskforce, 2007; Maunsell, 2007). 
Both were developed by a Peak Oil Taskforce set up to contain activists, industry and 
government. The Brisbane Taskforce included climate change as the two issues of 
course overlap though oil may be more imminent. Such reports need to be followed 
up with government structures such as an Office of Oil Vulnerability. 
 
2. Plan and build compact cities based around transit. 
The world’s cities existed and thrived before the age of oil; it is possible to imagine 
them transitioning to a future where oil is no longer needed. Car dependence is the 
problem that drives oil vulnerability .Thus cities must plan and build to overcome car 
dependence (Newman and Kenworthy, 1999).  
 
The solution to car dependence is a combination of transport infrastructure and land 
use policy as well as household education programs which have successfully reduced 
car use (eg. TravelSmart). This set of policy approaches has been recognized by all 
Australian cities in their Metropolitan Strategies and all suggest a policy of centres 
and transit-oriented corridors which can provide travel alternatives in every suburb.  
 
The major problems are not in the central and inner city areas as these have similar 
fuel consumption per person to Asian and European cities (6 to 17 GJ per person per 
year), they are comparatively well off in terms of public transport infrastructure, and 
they are dense and mixed in their land use. They will easily adapt to peak oil. 
However the newer suburbs in the outer areas of cities across the world, built in the 
past 4 or 5 decades, are heavily car dependent with fuel consumption similar to US 
cities (average 56 GJ per person per year). There are real equity issues here as the 
wealthy live mostly in inner areas and the poor increasingly are trapped on the fringe. 
There are signs that this is now happening in US cities with some outer area 
households using 40% of their income just to travel around to jobs and services. This 
will become intolerable after peak oil.  
 
The need for more compact, mixed use development in centres can also assist with the 
need for buildings to use less energy. Newton, Tucker and Ambrose (2000) have 
shown that in Australian conditions denser development will also save on building 
energy, mainly through a shared insulating effect. Direct attempts to increase these 
savings and to use green materials, green appliances and renewable power in the 
buildings will also be required.  
 
This strategy also requires ensuring social housing initiatives in any new centres and a 
crash program in public transport infrastructure for the middle and outer suburbs. 
Extensions of electric rail lines are the obvious way to go along with integrated local 
buses that can provide a service at least as quick as that provided by cars. Time 
savings will remain a bigger factor in determining mode of transport even under very 
high fuel costs.  
 
The Australian House of Representatives Report on Sustainable Cities ( 2005) 
recognizes all of these things and recommends that infrastructure funds (especially for 
rail) be provided for cities, especially in the middle and outer suburbs. Most national 
governments do this, even US cities already do this, and all countries need such a 
mechanism to cope with peak oil. Partnership funding of the required rail systems and 
integrated transport programs would follow if an Urban Infrastructure Program was 
begun.  
 
Perth’s new rail system is unusual across the world as its $2 billion cost (which has 
given the city a 180 km modern electric rail system with 72 stations) was built 
without any Federal funds, though the Freeway it passes down was funded almost 
entirely from Federal coffers. This railway (which is much cheaper than in many other 
cities due to government owning the land and only having to build two bridges) has 
been justified over many elections as a way of oil-proofing the city. There are many 
new developments planned around its stations to take advantage of this insurance and 
its obvious amenity now, which will become even more critical in the future. The new 
rail system has removed 100,000 cars from the road system and it is set to double 
again in the next decade. But there is much of Perth that remains highly vulnerable to 
peak oil as in most Australian and North American  cities.  
 
We cannot afford to build further and further out in cities as this inevitably builds car 
dependence. Most city plans now recognize that the main task is to redevelop in the 
present urban area, especially in Transit Oriented Developments around rail lines. 
Cities need to be more urban and the countryside more rural.  However there are 
many still who believe cities should be dispersed into rural areas as outlined above. 
Getting serious about oil depletion means that rural lifestyles on the edge of the city 
cannot be facilitated and subsidized as they have been. There is a real clash between 
those who want to ruralise cities and those who realize the problems this creates in car 
dependence. 
 
This does not mean that we do not try to create local eco-villages where people in 
cities can be more reliant on each other with reduced oil consumption as a result. Such 
places, like Christie Place in Adelaide, Somerville in Perth or Vaubun in Frieburg are 
essential to help us through this transition. But if they are an excuse to extend the city 
into areas that are better left rural, then they are not going to help. 
 
 
3. Rebuild peri-urban agriculture. 
A lot of the literature on peak oil suggests that the biggest impact is going to be on 
agriculture. Certainly agriculture has become very dependent on diesel. In the analysis 
above I have tried to show that I do not expect our cities to begin taking over from 
rural producers in the production of food and fibre. In fact the loss of good 
agricultural soils to fringe urban suburbs and hobby farms has to stop as they are 
generally very unproductive as well as being highly car dependent. The fringe areas of 
Australian cities ,where agricultural soils have been sacrificed to scattered suburbs 
and rural hobby farms like the Central Coast north of  Sydney and Mornington 
Peninsular in Melbourne, exhibit  3 to 4 times the average fuel consumption per 
person and 8 times that of the inner city. If we are serious about oil depletion and 
sustainability in general we need to ensure that the countryside is more rural as well 
as the city being more urban. This would also sustain the current attractiveness of 
Australia’s cities and rural hinterlands from a tourist point of view.  
 
One of the ways we can do this in Australian cities and I suspect in any city across the 
world, is to establish Horticultural Precincts immediately adjacent to cities. These 
areas need to set aside the good soils and ensure they are retained in perpetuity for 
horticulture rather than always being seen as superannuation for the next suburb. In 
these areas we can then get serious about recycling wastewater. Water Corporations 
cannot invest in the pipes and technology for this important new approach to urban 
technology unless they have certainty about the future for an area.  
 
Agriculture will need to adapt by growing its own biodiesel, using gas and switching 
to more efficient rail transport rather than trucks. This transition will need assistance 
and subsidized diesel is not helping. A crash program in diesel phase-out could 
change peri-urban agricultural oil vulnerability in a five year period. 
 
One of the obvious ways that agriculture will need to change is to become more 
localized. There may be a reduction in choice as regional produce will be favored 
over imported produce but this can be part of regional identity and the slow food 
movement, rather than deprivation. Cities should not need to import vegetables from 
other regions, especially by plane.  Wheat and other grains however are a bulk 
commodity which can be transported by train and ship at low oil or no oil cost. 
Agriculture needs to be more localized for the particular cities in its bioregion, as well 
as creating surpluses which are traded for the benefit of regional and urban 
opportunity.  
 
4. Facilitate localism. 
James H Kunstler (2005 ) in the Long Emergency says that in response to peak oil 
‘Our lives will become profoundly and intensely local.’ Localism is the required 
modus operandi for the post peak oil world, just as globalism was for the cheap oil 
era. Globalization of the economy began with the first cities that began to trade 
beyond their immediate region – probably 4000 years ago – and it will continue under 
a post peak oil world. But its character will alter as the extent of trade and movement 
cannot be expected to continue as though its transport costs were unimportant. As 
mentioned above there are social movements that are beginning to push us more 
towards localism anyway: the need for local identity and sense of place; the slow food 
movement and its base in local foods; the ecocity movement with its desire to enable 
local community to be the basis for managing local resources and local infrastructure; 
the local enterprise movement that has shown business development is best done with 
local social capital as its base (Sirolli, 2001). 
 
The value of the internet and video conference facilities on our phones will become 
even more obvious to maintain the global interaction that we have tasted and will not 
easily give up. But in the same way that governments have facilitated businesses to 
export globally and have pushed international tourism, we now need to facilitate 
localism. I would suggest we need an Office of Localism with a program to fund 
innovations in localism. This can help to fund demonstrations of new urban 
technologies where there is a need to create distributed energy and water 
infrastructure (involving less energy for distribution and pumping), localized 
industrial ecology of businesses that can share their wastes as resources or work 
together to ensure local resources are used and re-used; where local food linkages 
need to be linked up between peri-urban growers and urban communities to take 
direct supply of whatever is fresh; where local enterprises can be facilitated based on 
local resources and talents; where local tourism can be marketed to local people… 
 
5. Regulate for the post-oil transition. 
A systematic review of regulations will show that at present we subsidize oil 
consumption, whether it be through fuel rebates to producers, tax rules on cars and 
fuel, the subsidy on land development at the urban fringe (around $40,000 per block 
in most Australian cities without considering health and education services, see 
Newman and Kenworthy, 1999), as well as the subsidy given to road users in the form 
of state-based road building grants. Proactive regulation is also required to phase out 
the excessive use of four wheel drives and other gas guzzling cars with a clear phase-
in program for gas-based electric hybrid cars.  
 
The past twenty years saw a move away from regulation on vehicles and the result 
was declining overall fuel efficiency in the fleet. This cannot be allowed again – we 
must regulate for motor vehicles to transition away from oil and the first signs of this 
are now apparent in California. Governments can begin by regulating for their own 
fleets.  
 
Aviation is a special case. There seems to be  no alternative to oil on the horizon. The 
only solution it seems will be to allow gradual price increases to reduce unnecessary 
travel, to switch to fast trains for medium distance journeys, and to do more and more 
by internet conferencing (including family events). However, it would seem there 
would be a case to ensure that aviation had some priority on remaining fuel – this 
would also require some kind of regulation.  
 
Conclusions 
Australia, and probably most advanced countries, have developed highly complex 
scenarios for dealing with terrorism. There are no such scenarios for dealing with oil 
vulnerability and its implications for our cities. Strategic analysts and policy leaders 
need to take oil depletion seriously and see what must be done in short, medium and 
long term scenarios for reductions in oil supplies. The start of a process was there 
with the development of thinking about the Hydrogen Economy but this is long term. 
We need to see how we can reach the future where there is no oil in a series of steps 
in urban development. We cannot afford to depend on the market to handle this as it 
will always seem that cheap supplies of oil from the Middle East are the only thing we 
need to worry about and while they were expanding, we were not in trouble. Global 
supplies of oil are not expanding any longer and we cannot just hope that they will 
continue to grow again. A new urban world is emerging where we must adapt to using 
less non-renewable resources and using different technology and different urban 
forms or our vulnerability to oil will be seriously exposed.  
 
References 
Bentley R W 2002 Global oil and gas depletion: an overview Energy Policy, 
vol. 30, no3, pp. 189-205  
 Barlow R, McNelis B and Derrick A (1993) Solar Pumping, IT Publications, 
Intermediate Technology Development Group, London. 
Brown L 2006 Plan B 2.0 Rescuing a Planet Under Stress and a Civilisation in 
Trouble, New York, W W Norton.  
 
Campbell CJ (1991) The Golden Age of Oil, 1950-2050: the depletion of a 
resource. Kluwer, Dordrecht. 
City of Portland Peak Oil Taskforce (2007) Descending the Oil Peak: Navigating 
the Transition from Oil and Natural Gas, Office of Sustainable Development, City 
of Portland.  
Cohen D 2006 Inside the IEA’s Medium Term Oil Market, Energy Bulletin, 25th 
July. 
Consumer Reports (2006) ‘The Ethanol Myth’ October, pp 15-19.  
 
Diamond J (2005) Collapse: How Societies Choose to Fail or Succeed. Viking 
Books, New York. 
 
Deffeyes K S (2005 Beyond Oil : The View from Hubbert's Peak, Hill and Wang, 
New York. 
 
Deffeyes K S (2007) Beyond Oil: The View from Hubbert’s Peak, January 19th, 
http://www.princeton.edu/hubbert/current-events-07-01.html 
 
Government of Western Australia (2003) Focus on the Future: The State 
Sustainability Strategy, Department of the Premier and Cabinet, Perth. 
Gunther, F (2001). Fossil Energy and Food Security. Energy and Environment Vol 
12:4 p.253-275.  
 
Hirsch, R.L., Bezdek, R.H, Wendling, R.M. (2005) Peaking of World Oil 
Production: Impacts, Mitigation and Risk Management. DOE NETL. February. 
 
Holmgren D (2002) Permaculture: Principles & Pathways Beyond Sustainability, 
Holmgren Design Services. 
 
Holmgren D (2005) ‘Retrofitting the suburbs for sustainability’ Published on 30 Mar 




House of Representatives (2005) Sustainable Cities, Parliament House, Canberra. 
 
Hubbert, M. King (1956) ‘Nuclear Energy and the Fossil Fuels’. Presented before the 
Spring Meeting of the Southern District, American Petroleum Institute, Plaza Hotel, 
San Antonio, Texas, March 7-8-9, 1956. 
 
International Energy Agency (IEA) (2005 “Resources to Reserves: Oil & Gas 
Technologies for the Energy Markets of the Future,” IEA, Vienna.  
 
Kunstler J Howard (2005) The Long Emergency: Surviving the End of the Oil 
Age, Climate Change, and Other Converging Catastrophes of the Twenty-first 
Century, Atlantic Monthly Press, New York. 
Maunsells (2007) Climate Change and Energy Taskforce: Final Report, City of 
Brisbane. 
Morita MJ, Sedley K, Stern J (2001) The New Economy of Oil: Impacts on 
Business, Geopolitics and Society, Royal Institute of International Affairs, London.  
 
Newman P and Kenworthy J (1999) Sustainability and Cities: Overcoming 
Automobile Dependence, Island Press, Washington DC.  
 
Newman P and Kenworthy J (2007) ‘Greening Urban Transportation’ in O’meara M 
(ed) Our Urban Future: The State of the World 2007,  Worldwatch Institute, 
Norton, Washington DC.   
 
P.W. Newton, S.N. Tucker and M. Ambrose (2000) Housing Form, Energy Use and 
Greenhouse Gas Emissions, in K. Williams, E. Burton, and M Jenks (eds) Achieving 
Sustainable Urban Form, E&FN Spon, London, pp 74–83.  
 
Productivity Commission (2005) Fuel Taxation Inquiry, AGPS, Canberra.  
Samsam Bakhtiari, A M (2002) A Middle East View of the Global Oil Situation Proc. 
1st Intl Workshop on Oil Depletion, Uppsala, Sweden , Eds. Aleklett, K. and 
Campbell, C. 
Samsam Bakhtiari A M (2004) World oil production capacity model suggests output 
peak by 2006-07, Oil & Gas Journal, April 26. 
 
 
M Simmons 2002 US Energy Policy Issues, Ist International Conference on Oil 
Depletion, Uppsala, May 23, www.peakoil.net 
 
M Simmons 2003 Is the Glass Half Full or Half Empty?, 2nd International 
Conference on Oil Depletion, Uppsala, May 23, www.peakoil.net 
 
 
Simmons R (2005) Twilight in the Desert: The Coming Saudi Oil Shock and the 
World Economy, Wiley, New Jersey. 
 
Sirolli E (2001) Ripples from the Zambesi: Passion, Entrepreneurship and the 
Rebirth of Local Economies, New Society Press, Vancouver.  
 
STPP 2005 Driven to Spend: The Impact of Sprawl on Household Transportation 
Expenses, STPP and Center for Neighbourhood Technology, Eashington DC. 
 
Trainer T (1995) The Conserver Society: Alternatives for Sustainability, Zed 
Books, London. 
 
WA Government (2003) State Sustainability Strategy, Department of the Premier 
and Cabinet, Perth. 
 
 
 
 
